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Abstract
Populism has become the issue of comparative political science today. The rise and continuing success of populist par-
ties is by now evident across Europe, despite persistent cross-national variations. Populist parties’ electoral success and
their participation in government have raised questions about their impact: not just on established party systems, but also
on the systemic core of European democracies. In theory, this impact can be both beneficial for, as well as a challenge to
democracy in general, and the tenets of liberal constitutional democracy in particular. The presence of populist parties has,
in several cases, increased electoral turnout and public participation, which is generally seen as a positive effect whenmea-
suring the quality of democracy. However, populist parties’ rise also points to negative effects. In addition to profoundly
reshaping European party systems, they advocate what the populist Hungarian prime minister Viktor Orbán calls “illiberal
democracy”. Both as an ideal and as an institutional practice when in government, the illiberal remaking of democracy
implies eroding the separation of powers and subordinating constitutionally guaranteed individual civil and human rights
to an alleged “general will” and a particular conception of “the people”. The thematic issue explores the ideological supply,
favorable conditions, political contexts and dynamics, as well as the impact of the populist surge in Europe in relation to
the systemic consolidation of (il)liberal democracy on a theoretical and comparative empirical level.
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1. The Fourth Wave of Populism and the Rise of
Populist Parties in Europe: From Pariahs to Power
Brokers
Populismhas arguably become the issue of European pol-
itics and comparative political science today. The rise,
relevance, and continuing success of populist parties
is by now evident in party system change across Eu-
rope, despite persistent cross-national variations. This
ongoing development has been conceived as the “fourth
wave” of populism (Mudde, 2013).1 It is remarkably dif-
ferent, however, from the previous wave, which was
characterized by the initial breakthrough of new, mod-
ernized populist parties in themid-1980s (Abromeit, Nor-
man, Marotta, & Chesterton, 2015; Ignazi, 2003; Mudde,
2007). Almost exclusively carried by parties from the
1 Von Beyme (1985) distinguishes three successive ways preceding the current wave of populist parties.
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right, it affected a more limited number of European
countries. These parties largely remained pariahs of Eu-
ropean politics and their electoral and political impact
remained rather limited (Mudde, 2013). Electoral suc-
cesses were often followed by failures, and fluctuating
parliamentary representations corresponded with a lim-
ited, mostly discursive or agenda-influencing political
footprint, even if populists did take public office (mostly
as junior partners) in government (Akkerman& de Lange,
2012; Albertazzi & McDonnell, 2015; Frölich-Steffen &
Rensmann, 2007; Minkenberg, 2001; Rovira Kaltwasser
& Taggart, 2016).
Observations that the electoral (and political) impact
of populist parties has been very limited may have been
valid in comparative terms until a few years ago (Mudde,
2013). They are, however, in need of re-assessment in
view of the scope and force of the fourth wave of pop-
ulism. After all, populist actors have improved their elec-
toral fortunes considerably and have left their marks in
party politics the world over. Indeed, they are in the pro-
cess of reshaping party competition and politics in estab-
lished Western liberal democracies. A steady, partly dra-
matic electoral rise enabled many of these parties to en-
ter parliaments and governments, in Central Eastern Eu-
rope even as governingmajorities. This includes the Hun-
garian Fidesz (governing continuously since 2010) and
the Polish Law and Justice Party (PiS, governing with an
outrightmajority since 2015). And in Italy there is by now
a populist majority reflecting the collapse of the estab-
lished post-war party system in the political earthquake
of themani pulite corruption scandals in 1992–1993 and
subsequent political crises eroding trust in mainstream
parties (Bobba & McDonnell, 2015).2
In 2016, populists celebrated unexpected successes
in two of the oldest, most stable democracies: UKIP by
winning the Brexit referendum it fought for, and, across
the Atlantic, Donald Trump by winning the US presi-
dency. Since then, the populist phenomenon has fully
entered center stage of political debates and scholarly
interest. Although the 2017 election cycle was overall
perceived as producingmixed results—therewas no pop-
ulist sweep across Europe—populist parties gained votes
in the Netherlands, 10.6 million voters opted for radi-
cal right-wing populist Marine Le Pen (Front National)
in the 2nd round of the 2017 French presidential elec-
tions,3 while in Austria the populist FPÖ re-entered gov-
ernment after a successful xenophobic electoral cam-
paign. Even in Germany, a right-wing populist party—
the Alternative für Deutschland (AfD)—entered parlia-
ment for the first time and immediately became the third
largest party. Moreover, the AfD and the left-wing pop-
ulist Linkspartei together received 21.8% of the popular
vote, profoundly challenging one of the hitherto most
stable party systems in Europe. Moreover, transnational
ideological, organizational and discursive similarities are
reinforced through mutual “learning effects” in a Euro-
peanized and globalized context (Akkerman, de Lange, &
Rooduijn, 2016).4
2. The Populist Challenge: Liberal Constitutional
Democracies and Dimensions of Populist Politics of
Discontent
The populist parties’ electoral success and their partici-
pation in government have raised questions about their
impact. Not just with regard to established party sys-
tems, but also in relation to the systemic core of Euro-
pean democracies. In theory, this impact can be both
beneficial for, as well as a challenge to democracy in
general, and the tenets of liberal constitutional democ-
racy in particular (e.g. Mudde & Rovira Kaltwasser, 2013).
The presence of populist parties can increase electoral
turnout, public participation, and representation under
certain conditions (Huber & Ruth, 2017; Immerzeel &
Pickup, 2015). However, populist parties’ rise also points
to potential negative effects. In addition to profoundly
reshaping European party systems, they advocate what
the populist Hungarian prime minister Viktor Orbán calls
“illiberal democracy”. Both as an ideal and as an institu-
tional practice when in government, the illiberal remak-
ing of democracy implies eroding the separation of pow-
ers and subordinating constitutionally guaranteed indi-
vidual civil and human rights to an alleged “general will”
and a particular conception of “the people”. Recurring
strategies and features of populist political mobilization
appeal to these illiberal sentiments, alongside desires
to break the rules of civil society and discourses of fear
and crisis (Moffitt & Tormey, 2014; Rensmann, 2017a;
Wodak, 2015).
The thematic issue explores the ideological supply,
favorable conditions, political contexts and dynamics,
as well as the impact of the populist surge in Europe
in relation to the systemic consolidation of (il)liberal
democracy on a theoretical and comparative empirical
level. Avoiding generic claims about the “end of poli-
tics” (Mouffe, 2005) that are difficult to test, the au-
thors engage with a dynamic, interactive understanding
of populist parties’ ideological changes and responses by
established parties (and liberal democracy) to the pop-
ulist challenge (Kriesi, 2014). Notwithstanding its con-
2 There is also a distinctly South European context and playing field. In Greece and Spain, where liberal democracy did not arrive until the 1970s, left-wing
populist parties like Syriza and Podemos recently emerged as the most succesful populist parties, in contrast to most other European countries. In Italy,
theMovimento Cinque Stelle, which is ideologically neither left nor right but populist, quickly became a major organization, adding to the already large
spectrum of populist parties.
3 The pro-European candidate Emmanuel Macron, to be sure, defeated her by a large margin (Rubin, 2017).
4 Radical right populist parties have recently also reinforced their cross-national organizational and political ties in the European Parliament and beyond.
The political group “Europe of Nations and Freedom” in the European Parliament, launched in 2015, prominently includes the AfD fromGermany, Geert
Wilders’ single-member party Partij voor de Vrijheit (PVV) from the Netherlands, the Front National (FN) from France, the Lega Nord from Italy, the
Austrian Freedom Party (FPÖ) from Austria, and Vlaams Belang (VB) from Belgium. Several of these actors also expressed support for US President
Trump whose success they explicitly see as a model.
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tested nature and presence as a fuzzy buzzword in po-
litical debates, “populism” has been successfully opera-
tionalized in systematic studies of contemporary actors
challenging established liberal-democratic politics in Eu-
rope and beyond (Mudde & Rovira Kaltwasser, 2013). In-
deed, “populism” properly conceptualized, is especially
well suited to understand key features of the most sig-
nificant, electorally successful—new or transformed—
movement-party types and other political actors gaining
ground in European politics today. And while there is a
variety of challengers liberal and representative democ-
racy and party systems face (Pappas, 2016), themost suc-
cessful and relevant are populist parties.
To facilitate the discussions between the contribu-
tions in the issue and to be able to draw conclusion
on the basis of the separate studies, we present two
minimal definitions. We conceive of populism as a thin-
centered ideology (or discourse) “that considers society
to be ultimately separated into two homogeneous and
antagonistic groups, ‘the pure people’ versus ‘the cor-
rupt elite’, and which argues that politics should be an
expression of the volonté générale (general will) of the
people” (Mudde, 2004). Because of its nature, populism
can be combined with left- and right-wing, or other ide-
ologies. In addition, we conceive of liberal democracy as
consisting of two pillars: on the one hand, institutional-
ized forms of popular, democratic sovereignty (i.e. free
and fair elections among equal members, forms of rep-
resentative government, a free public sphere and me-
dia, and other democratic procedures of popular and plu-
ralistic will-formation and inclusion), and on the other
hand liberal constitutional rights and principles (i.e. in-
dividual civil, political and human rights and liberties, in-
cluding freedom of expression, separation of powers, an
independent judiciary; Plattner, 2010). Both constitutive
pillars, the exercise of democratic public autonomy and
the constitutionally guaranteed “private” autonomy of
individual rights and liberties, can work as mutually re-
inforcing (or “co-original”, in Habermas’ words [1998]),
but may also be in tension if output from the first pil-
lar, which points to the particular will-formation of a
particular political community, clashes with the inher-
ently universalistic norms and undercurrents of the sec-
ond (e.g. in a “tyranny of the majority”, or illiberal forms
of democracy, threatening the latter) (e.g. Kornhauser,
1959). However, countries regularly holding free and fair
democratic elections aremore likely to protect individual
rights, and vice versa (Plattner, 2010).
The debate about illiberal democracy thereby points
to nativist or exclusionary, particularistic critiques of lib-
eral democracy as well as to procedural criticisms of rep-
resentative democracy in the populist mobilization of
discontent. It points to a socio-cultural divide identified
by Bornschier (2010) affecting the character of liberal
democracies and to an actual crisis of liberal democracy
that is, however, simultaneously promoted, constructed
and reinforced by its populist critics.
3. Populism and the Remaking of (Il)liberal Democracy
in Europe: Findings
Based on cross-national studies, the thematic issue ex-
plores the relationship between populist discontent and
liberal democracy (and its cultural undercurrents). Exist-
ing studies indicate that the causes of the rise of populist
parties and the extent to which effects on liberal democ-
racies materialize depend on the characteristics of the
populist parties themselves (Akkerman et al., 2016) and
on those of the political systems and political cultures
in which these parties compete. The central question to
which the different contributions of this thematic issue
respond is two-fold: What are the political/cultural con-
ditions or crises within liberal democracies that are favor-
able to the current rise of populist parties, and how does
the emergence of populism impact on (the quality of) lib-
eral democracy in Europe? In other words, the contribu-
tions seek to unravel through whichmechanisms and un-
der which conditions the presence of European populist
parties and leaders, currently riding on a wave of elec-
toral success, are engendered in different political, cul-
tural, and media contexts, and have impact on various
key characteristics of liberal democracies, such as levels
of democratic inclusion and participation of citizens (and
denizens), democratic political culture, civil, social and
political civil rights, the separation of powers, an inde-
pendent judiciary, and a free, diverse and pluralistic pub-
lic sphere.
Theoretical reconceptualizations of conditions and
dynamics, as well as comparative empirical research in
this issue seek to rethink and systematize the extent
to which the causes and effects of populist actors are
conditional on certain factors, such as 1) the specific or
shared “modernized” political ideologies of “left-wing”
and “right-wing” or nativist populist parties, 2) the ex-
clusion or inclusion of populist parties from government,
3) the type of government in which populist parties par-
ticipate (i.e. type of coalition, formal or informal par-
ticipation), 4) historical legacies and the degree of con-
solidation of (il)liberal democracy (especially taking ac-
count of differences between Western liberal democra-
cies and post-Communist Eastern liberal democracies,
where populists are on average more successful today),
or 5) the contexts of political cultures and dominant so-
cial values in which populist parties operate (e.g. dynam-
ics of social value change and backlash, dominant cul-
tural/democratic self-understandings).
The studies show that the hitherto underexplored
relationship between populism and (il)liberal democracy
is more complex than initially conceived. Assessing the
scope of a multi-faceted challenge, they yield mixed find-
ings on the negative impact or threat to the future of
liberal democracy and its robustness. Approaching the
issue from both a comparative European perspective
and a more specific regional focus, studies vary in their
assessment of this relationship.While some suggest that
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the transformative impact may be more limited than
often claimed in recent public debates (especially on
Central Eastern Europe, where populist majorities gov-
ern and recently have been reprimanded by the Euro-
pean Union), others argue that populism’s negative im-
pact on democratic political cultures—and the quality of
democracy—in Europe is more profound and has rather
been underestimated. In light of broader long-term shifts
in cultural self-understandings and a traditionalist or au-
thoritarian social value backlash against globalization, di-
versity, and liberal democratic principles often promoted
or reinforced by populists, these studies diagnose an in-
creased readiness to suspend or break with established
norms and constitutional frameworks. This development
is likely to further transform liberal democracies and con-
solidate populist successes.
In his article, Benjamin Moffitt (2017) questions the
much-echoed equation of populismwith illiberalism. Tak-
ing cue from right-wing populist parties in Northern Euro-
pean countries (i.e. the Netherlands, Denmark, Sweden,
Norway), Moffitt argues that the relationship between
populist politics and liberalism is more complicated than
usually assumed. Populism is not necessarily “profoundly
illiberal”. He makes the case for a mode of “liberal illib-
eralism”, a selective, nationalist liberalism that is discur-
sively employed to “put amore ‘acceptable’ face” on illib-
eral politics. In this way,Moffitt also implicitly shows that
hesitance with regard to generalizations about populist
politics allows for the articulation of regional variations
and differences throughout Europe.
While recognizing politico-cultural specificities and
significant cross-national variations, Lars Rensmann
(2017b) argues that the rise of populist parties is part of a
trans-national, illiberal backlash reflecting a deep cultural
divide within European democracies that is increasingly
reflected and mobilized in transformed political spaces.
In his reconceptualization of European populist parties,
he adds cultural dimensions that left- and right-wing pop-
ulists share. In order to understand and assess the scope
and origins of the fourth wave of populist politics in Eu-
rope, Rensmann proposes a cultural turn in the study of
populism beyond conventional political science frame-
works. His research takes this cultural turn into three
directions, integrating insights from three currently still
marginalized fields: political sociology, political psychol-
ogy, and media studies. They help illuminate, it is ar-
gued, the cultural conditions fromwhich today’s populists
benefit—a long lingering cultural counter-revolution, the
socio-psychological dynamics of an authoritarian cultural
revolt articulated by populists, and a transformed com-
municative environment shaped by social media.
Matthijs Rooduijn, Wouter van der Brug, Sarah de
Lange, and Jante Parlevliet (2017) examine in their article
whether exposure to populismmakes citizens more cyni-
cal about politics. More specifically, they assess whether
exposure to populist messages affect only those already
favourably predisposed towards populist parties or all
citizens, irrespective of their existing attitudes. On the
basis of survey experiment, in which a representative
sample of Dutch citizens had to read a newspaper arti-
cle containing either a populist or a non-populist mes-
sage, they study the impact of populism on political cyn-
icism. The authors find that the participants that read
the populist message weremore cynical afterwards than
the participants that were exposed to a “neutrally for-
mulated” message. Interestingly, they also conclude that
not all citizens exposed to the populist message are
equally affected. In fact, the effect of the exposure to
populism is only significant for participants that support
populist parties.
Robert Huber and Christian Schimpf (2017) empiri-
cally analyze differences and commonalities in the way
populist parties of the left and right relate to democ-
racy and democratic quality. They argue that populism
should not be considered in isolation from its (left or
right) host-ideology. Using data from 30 European coun-
tries between 1990 and 2012, Huber and Schimpf show
that populist parties can exert distinct influences on mi-
nority rights depending on their left or right orientation
while, however, the association between populist par-
ties and mutual constraints is a consequence of the pop-
ulist element.
Emphasizing Central Eastern European context speci-
ficity and differences within the region, Lenka Bustikova
and Petra Guasti (2017) investigate the democratic back-
sliding, and the extent to which it is the result of rising
populism, in the Visegrad countries. On the basis of a
comparison of developments in the Czech Republic, Hun-
gary, Poland and Slovakia they state that the notion of
democratic backsliding, which is often used in the lit-
erature on democracies in Central and Eastern Europe,
is flawed. The concept of backsliding suggests that in
the Visegrad countries a clear break exists from a lib-
eral trajectory to an illiberal one. The authors demon-
strate that the countries under investigation have not
gone through a linear process of democratization and
consolidation in the 1990s and early 2000s, nor have they
gone through a linear process of de-democratization and
de-consolidation in more recent years. Instead, they ob-
serve a sequence of “episodes” delineated by elections,
some of which can be characterized as “illiberal swerves”.
In Hungary, and to a lesser extent in Poland, the swerving
has persisted over multiple elections. In these countries
the “illiberal swerving” has resulted in an “illiberal turn”.
In his review, which concludes this thematic issue,
John Abromeit (2017) engages with five recent studies
that have intervened in the empirical, conceptual and
methodological debates on contemporary global pop-
ulism. As each of these studies claim to make an innova-
tive contribution to the field in their own right, Abromeit
prudently assesses their merits and shortcomings. In
doing so, his main criticisms revolve around construc-
tivist approaches to populism and the use of history in
some studies. Abromeit takes issue with the theoreti-
cal assumptions and (perceived) explanatory capacity un-
derlying constructivist (e.g. discursive, performative) ap-
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proaches to populism, but also hints at tendencies to-
wards historical reductionism in some of the studies un-
der review. Moreover, he acknowledges that the concep-
tual grammar of (group and social) psychologymight con-
tribute to the field, but in the same breath states that
the ways in which such angles are employed offer little
explanation for identification processes that are key to
populist politics at large.
Be that as itmay, the studies and new research all rec-
ognize that the current populist boom reflects a steady,
consolidated ascendancy over a decade or more. It indi-
cates that new and old populist actors maneuver more
successfully through a changing political and (social) me-
dia landscape and actor environments, often outflanking
the external supply side of established parties and ap-
peals. This fourthwave of populism hereby benefits from
what CasMudde (2004) once aptly called a “populist zeit-
geist” and profoundly transformed demand side condi-
tions in post-industrial, globalized societies: readjusted
political, cultural and social value cleavages in a rapidly
changing communicative social media environment as
well as lingering socioeconomic and cultural crises of lib-
eral representative democracy. It points to deep-seated
discontent and a declining stability and cultural appeal of
consolidated, representative liberal democracies. A cri-
sis which populists seem to both construct and effec-
tively exploit. While political scientists should be reluc-
tant to make long-term predictions, the thematic issue
suggests that there are few reasons that the populist phe-
nomenon within liberal democracies is a transitory chal-
lenge likely to disappear any time soon. Rather, it is likely
part of European liberal democracy’s future, thereby con-
tinuing to change the political cultures and party systems
that shaped Europe’s post-war horizon.
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